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INTRODUCTION
One of the least explained phenomena in American corporate
law is the puzzling circularity of director and officer liability in-
surance and indemnification. Under the auspices of state corpo-
rate law, virtually all public corporations use internal and exter-
nal insurance to protect their boards and management from li-
ability for breach of fiduciary duties.' The concept of liability in-
surance and indemnification in relation to shareholder fiduciary
claims seems on its face futile. Arguably, there is no utility for
shareholders in suing corporate fiduciaries for damages when fi-
t John M. Olin Fellow, Columbia University Center for Law and Economic Studies. I
benefited greatly from the comments of William Allen, Jennifer Arlen, Ian Ayres, Kyle
Bagwell, Dan Bailey, Franklin Balotti, Lisa Bernstein, Bernard Black, Bruce Chapman,
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Mitchell Polinsky, Chris Sanchirico, Marshall Small, Eric Talley, Michael Trebilcock,
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' Of the 1,386 United States firms that participated in a 1998 survey, 92 percent re-
ported purchasing director and officer liability insurance. Insurance was even more
prevalent among publicly traded firms. Of the survey participants with 500 or more
shareholders, 98 percent reported having coverage. Moreover, every survey participant
who conducted an initial public offering within the last five years reported having cover-
age. See 1998 Directors and Officers Liability Survey: U.S. and Canadian Results 8-17
(Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 1999) ("Towers Perrin Liability Survey"). Similarly, practically
all public corporations have bylaw provisions that mandate the extension of indemnifica-
tion rights whenever indemnification is permissible. See Advanced Mining Systems, Inc v
Fricke, 623 A2d 82, 83 (Del Chanc 1992). Most state laws limit indemnification in share-
holder derivative suits to expenses incurred during the suit. In contrast, insurance may
reimburse defendants both for expenses and for amounts paid in settlements or judg-
ments. See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 145(a)-(b) (1998); Cal Corp Code § 317(c) (West
1999); NY Bus Corp Law §§ 722(c), 726 (McKinney 1999); Revised Model Bus Corp Act
§ 8.51(c) (1994). As a practical matter, insurers reimburse firms for indemnification pay-
ments made to individual defendants (corporate reimbursement coverage) and reimburse
individual defendants for payments not indemnified (personal coverage). See John F. Ol-
son and Josiah 0. Hatch III, Director and Officer Liability: Indemnification and Insurance
§ 10.05 at 10-13, -14 (West 1998); Towers Perrin Liability Survey at 30.
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duciaries pay most of these damages using funds provided by
shareholders.2 The resulting transaction and litigation costs sim-
ply seem superfluous.3
This Article argues that insurance and indemnification can
be a socially desirable mechanism that induces plaintiffs to sue
yet keeps sanctions low. Although litigation is costly, and should
ordinarily be kept at a minimum, shareholder litigation can be
cost effective in view of the indeterminacy that characterizes cor-
porate law. American corporate law relies heavily on open-ended
legal standards that grant courts wide discretion in resolving
corporate disputes. Rather than provide corporate actors with
bright line rules that delineate proper behavior, the law provides
only inconclusive criteria that courts may deem relevant when
applying the standards ex post. Corporate actors who try to plan
their behavior in accordance with the law must therefore assess-
with some uncertainty-where the threshold of liability lies.4 The
' Circularity is complete in the case of derivative suits, where directors and officers
are the defendants and all shareholders sue on behalf of the firm. In the case of class ac-
tions, such as suits brought by shareholders who tendered their shares in a management
buyout or another freezeout merger, both the firm and its directors and officers are the de-
fendants. Here, insurance and indemnification is circular only with respect to liability al-
located to directors and officers. However, this portion is substantial and normally exceeds
half the liability.
' As Paul Mahoney rightly points out, liability insurance and indemnification would
not be puzzling if its cost was deducted from director and officer pay. See Paul G. Ma-
honey, The First Thing We Do, Let's Pay All the Lawyers, 66 U Chi L Rev 922, 923 (1999).
See also Steven Shavell, On liability and insurance, 13 Bell J Econ 120 (1982). In practice,
however, director and officer pay does not seem to reflect this cost. See John E. Core, On
the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance, 64 J Risk & Ins 63 (1997)
(finding no support in a sample of Canadian firms for the hypothesis that liability insur-
ance substitutes for cash compensation paid to directors); John E. Core, The Directors' and
Officers' Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Cost of Weak Corporate Gov-
ernance 22-24 (Feb 15, 1999) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (finding that both insurance pre-
miums and chief executive pay are higher when corporate governance mechanisms are
weak in a sample of Canadian firms). Similarly, while litigation typically drives insurance
costs up, it has no measurable effect on managerial compensation. See Roberta Romano,
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J L Econ & Org 55, 71 (1991)
(finding no changes in managerial compensation following litigation in a sample of Ameri-
can firms). For the argument that contracts between corporate fiduciaries and sharehold-
ers are generally not the product of efficient bargaining, see Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum L Rev 1403 (1985). For
the argument that director and officer compensation in particular cannot fully reflect legal
exposure, see Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, and Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder
Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Georgetown L J 1733, 1745-48 (1994).
" For an analysis of the indeterminacy in corporate law, as epitomized by Delaware
law, see Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 Colum L Rev 1908, 1913-18 (1998). The duty of loyalty is no exception to this gen-
eral pattern. Although corporate fiduciaries can reduce their liability risk by disclosing
their conflict of interest to disinterested directors or shareholders and seeking their ap-
proval, following these steps does not preclude judicial inspection of both the decision and
the way it was approved. For the flexible tests that are part of this inspection, see, for ex-
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absence of clear legal rules is costly. First, it leads to variance in
assessments of the legal standard and thus to divergences of be-
havior from the social optimum. Some corporate fiduciaries may
overestimate the legal constraints and forgo efficient transac-
tions, while others may underestimate the very same constraints
and carry out inefficient transactions. Second, legal indetermi-
nacy creates liability risk, which risk-averse fiduciaries are in a
poor position to bear. Exposing corporate fiduciaries to this risk
makes their services more costly and less productive to share-
holders.
The scenario just described bears on the optimal enforcement
policy for corporate law. Normally, optimal enforcement is said to
combine the highest sanctions defendants can bear with corre-
spondingly low rates of enforcement.' In civil law, this can be
achieved through decoupled liability.' While defendants pay the
maximum possible, plaintiffs receive a lower amount, thus cre-
ating optimal deterrence with minimal litigation. However, legal
indeterminacy in the corporate law context warrants the opposite
type of decoupling, whereby defendants pay less than the maxi-
mum they can bear and plaintiffs-or, in shareholder suits, plain-
tiffs' attorneys-receive more than the defendant pays. Liability
insurance and indemnification achieves precisely this effect.7
ample, Kahn v Tremont Corp, 694 A2d 422, 428 (Del 1997) (describing arm's length bar-
gaining); Cinerama, Inc v Technicolor, Inc, 663 A2d 1156, 1167-68 (Del 1995) (evaluating
an undisclosed material interest of board members); Cede & Co v Technicolor, Inc, 634
A2d 345, 361-64 (Del 1993) (defining a material interest of board members in a transac-
tion); Citron v Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp, 569 A2d 53, 70 (Del 1989) (defining
control of the corporation by a minority shareholder); Rosenblatt v Getty Oil Co, 493 A2d
929, 944-45 (Del 1985) (setting the scope of disclosure to shareholders); Weinberger v UOP,
Inc, 457 A2d 701, 711 (Del 1983) (using an entire fairness standard); In re Tri-Star Pic-
tures, Inc, 20 Del J Corp L 854, 862 (Del Chanc 1995) (addressing board domination).
' See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ
169 (1968). There are several exceptions to this. See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky
and Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81
Am Econ Rev 618 (1991) (income level); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Op-
timal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J Pub Econ 89 (1984) (nonmonetary sanctions);
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am Econ Rev 880 (1979) (risk aversion).
' See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling liability: optimal incentives
for care and litigation, 22 RAND J Econ 562 (1991).
' This explanation does not preclude other possible benefits of insurance and indemni-
fication. According to one theory, liability insurers provide valuable monitoring services
that justify the cost. See Clifford G. Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors,
10 Intl Rev L & Econ 115, 116 (1990). See also Noel O'Sullivan, Insuring the Agents: The
Role of Directors' and Officers' Insurance in Corporate Governance, 64 J Risk & Ins 545
(1997) (finding substitutability between insurance and alternative monitoring devices in a
sample of British firms). To the extent that such monitoring is effective, its value only
adds to that of the decoupling mechanism described here. The decoupling rationale also
complements the argument that firms buy liability insurance in order to lower expected
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The combination of less than maximum sanctions and high
rates of enforcement is optimal for two reasons. First, litigation
can reduce legal uncertainty. As decided cases accumulate, the
interpretation and proper application of fiduciary standards be-
come clearer, allowing directors and officers to estimate legal out-
comes more accurately and thus to behave closer to the social op-
timum. Second, the combination of low sanctions and high en-
forcement also reduces the risk corporate fiduciaries bear. Insofar
as fiduciaries are risk averse, their disutility from high and infre-
quent monetary sanctions exceeds their disutility from low and
frequent sanctions, despite the fact that the expected sanction is
the same. The difference between the two is a deadweight loss to
society, which can be reduced by making sanctions low and fre-
quent.
One clarification is in order. While I argue that liability in-
surance and indemnification can be an efficient response to a
given level of indeterminacy in corporate law, I do not claim that
it is efficient as practiced today. For one thing, litigation has
costs, which must be weighed against any gains it generates.
While the development of legal doctrine and reduction of liability
risk are undeniably desirable, they may not justify the substan-
tial costs of shareholder claims. Moreover, it is not clear that the
current level of insurance and indemnification coverage is opti-
mal. Insurance and indemnification may overprotect defendants
fiom sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty and encourage ex-
cessive filing and quick settlement of frivolous lawsuits. Finally,
the extent to which corporate law relies on open-ended standards
may or may not be efficient. Even if insurance and indemnifica-
bankruptcy losses. See David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate De-
mand for Insurance, 55 J Bus 281, 284-85 (1982). Decoupling is effective independent of
whether the burden that expected indemnity payments impose on firms is substantial.
Others have justified insurance and indemnification on the basis that firms can benefit by
protecting risk-averse fiduciaries from liability risk instead of increasing their direct com-
pensation. See Mark E. Parry and Arthur E. Parry, The Purchase of Insurance by a Risk-
Neutral Firm for a Risk-Averse Agent, 58 J Risk & Ins 30 (1991). Existing evidence, how-
ever, does not support the claim of substitutability between direct compensation and in-
surance. See note 3. By contrast, the decoupling rationale for insurance and indemnifica-
tion is reinforced by, but does not depend upon, managerial risk aversion. Nor does the ra-
tionale depend on substitutability between direct compensation and insurance.
' For the role of precedents in clarifying the law, see Marcel Kahan and Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate"), 83 Va L Rev 713, 722-23 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 775-78 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557, 578-79, 611-16 (1992); Rob-
erta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L Econ & Org
225, 277-78 (1985); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J L & Econ 249, 271-72 (1976).
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tion serves as an efficient decoupling device in response to these
standards, it is debatable whether its open-endedness is in all
cases inescapable.9
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the costs of
indeterminacy in corporate law and makes the case for address-
ing indeterminacy by increasing enforcement and reducing sanc-
tions. Part II explains how liability insurance and indemnifica-
tion achieves the combination of high enforcement and low sanc-
tions by serving as a decoupling device. Part HI examines several
considerations relevant for determining whether current insur-
ance and indemnification practices achieve efficient decoupling,
focusing on the cost of litigation, the need for decoupling to en-
courage litigation, the impact of insurance and indemnification
on settlement rates, and the adequacy of deterrence where insur-
ance and indemnification coverage is complete. The discussion
then inquires whether state competition in corporate chartering
can ensure that the current law is efficient in all of these re-
spects, and concludes that it can do so only in a limited way.
While competing states can benefit from addressing indetermi-
nacy, they may lack the incentives to address it in the most effi-
cient way.
I. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR CORPORATE LAW
American corporate law is not an exact science. Rather, it is
a set of loosely defined guidelines made concrete by courts after
the fact. The message the guidelines carry, in general, is that
corporate fiduciaries simply must do their utmost to promote
shareholder interests. Exactly what this means in practice is not
clear. Although court decisions list relevant criteria for judging
managerial behavior, these criteria are not exhaustive. Indeed,
courts often emphasize their incompleteness, leaving the legal
community wondering what additional criteria may prove rele-
vant in the future.'° The following discussion investigates the ef-
fects of this legal indeterminacy on social welfare and its implica-
tions for law enforcement. Drawing on the widely accepted idea
that legal certainty is important for business planning," it argues
that indeterminacy leads managerial behavior to diverge from
' The questionable efficiency of open-endedness in corporate law is analyzed in Ka-
mar, 98 Colum L Rev 1908 (cited in note 4). This Article accordingly discusses the issue
mostly by reference to that analysis.
,0 See the examples cited in note 4.
See, for example, Kahan and Klausner, 83 Va L Rev at 722-23 (cited in note 8);
Klausner, 81 Va L Rev at 777 (cited in note 8); Romano, 1 J L Econ & Org at 250-51 (cited
in note 8).
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the social optimum and exposes corporate fiduciaries to socially
costly sanctions.12 The analysis then inquires what enforcement
policy can minimize the costs of indeterminacy and concludes
that a combination of moderate sanctions and frequent enforce-
ment can best achieve this goal.
A. The Costs of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law
The primary cost of indeterminacy in corporate law is that it
undermines the efficacy of the law in directing managerial be-
havior. No matter how strong the incentives to comply with the
law, confusion about its precise meaning inevitably leads direc-
tors and officers to behave differently from the way they should.
To see this, consider first a simple world in which a single crite-
rion determines the propriety of managerial behavior, and the
only uncertainty pertains to its degree. Suppose, for example,
that price is the only relevant criterion for evaluating managerial
behavior in management buyouts, 3 and that the most one can
glean from the precedents is that while a buyout price that far
exceeds the current share price is likely to be upheld, a price only
slightly higher than the current price may be deemed too low. In
this scenario, different corporate fiduciaries may well have differ-
ent estimates of the legally sufficient premium, and of their po-
tential liability.'4 As a result, their behavior will differ. Even if
each fiduciary is prepared to bear the same expected liability,
"2 Needless to say, the discussion here refers only to behavior subject to judicial scru-
tiny. Even perfectly determinate law does not ensure that all decisions made by corporate
fiduciaries are socially optimal. Many erroneous decisions receive full immunity under the
business judgment rule. They are clearly not affected by the law. But in all areas of corpo-
rate activity outside the protection of the business judgment rule-that is, whenever law
matters-indeterminacy is disruptive.
" In practice, judicial review of management buyouts is far more complex than a mere
price adequacy test and includes other criteria, such as whether the board probed the
market and entertained competing offers before it decided to approve the buyout. As will
be shown below, the existence of multiple criteria only exacerbates the costs of indetermi-
nacy.
" The analysis here differs from that in Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deter-
rence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L Econ & Org 279 (1986), and Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law 79-83, 93-97 (Harvard 1987). These models assume
that the probability of liability for any choice of behavior is common knowledge and pref-
erences are uniform. See Craswell and Calfee, 2 J L Econ & Org at 281. They show that
under this assumption, legal uncertainty typically results in overdeterrence, which can be
corrected either by making the legal standard less exacting or by reducing the sanction.
Legal uncertainty still entails a cost because it exposes individuals to costly sanctions
even when their behavior is optimal. These sanctions may increase when the law becomes
more uncertain because at some point greater uncertainty begins to weaken deterrence.
This Article relaxes the assumption of uniform expectations and preferences in order to
demonstrate an additional cost of uncertainty that is independent of the costliness of sanc-
tions.
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some will offer shareholders only a low premium over stock price,
while others will offer a high premium. Their different choices
may persist notwithstanding their access to the same legal prece-
dents and commentary and despite their knowledge of the choices
made by others. 5 The divergence of their assessments will reflect
the degree of indeterminacy in the law. As legal indeterminacy
increases, so will disagreement, and so will the variance in indi-
vidual behavior. No matter how sanctions are set, this will inevi-
tably lead to greater divergence of behavior from the social opti-
mum. 16
Once we abandon our simple world for the real one in which
corporate legal standards involve multiple criteria, the variance
in estimates and thus in behavior is likely to be even greater.
Disagreement can be considerable, for example, when courts take
into account not only price but also the timing of the transaction,
the publicity it is given, the tax advantages it confers, the firm's
declining performance, or other factors that point to the directors'
good faith belief that the shareholders received the best price. 17
Beliefs are likely to further diverge in the event that another bid-
der is competing with management to buy the firm. Here the law
instructs the board to consider for each bid, among other things,
the adequacy and terms of the offer; its fairness and feasibility;
the proposed or factual financing of the offer and the conse-
quences of that financing; questions of illegality; the impact of the
bid on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reason-
' See David M. Kreps, A course in microeconomic theory 111, 370 (Princeton 1990)
(arguing that equally informed individuals may have different predictions concerning un-
certain future events); Stephen Morris, The Common Prior Assumption in Economic The-
ory, 11 Econ & Phil 227 (1995) (same). The possibility that equally informed individuals
will hold different beliefs concerning potential liability is standard in legal scholarship.
See, for example, Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and
the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J Legal Stud 575, 602 (1997); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal
Stud 399,423-26 (1973).
" The analysis here employs a similar logic to that in Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Prob-
ability of Apprehension, 21 J Legal Stud 365 (1992). Bebchuk and Kaplow study uncer-
tainty concerning the probability of apprehension. Omri Ben-Shahar uses a similar
framework to study uncertainty concerning the severity of sanctions. See Omri Ben-
Shahar, Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When Individuals Learn the
Penalty Only by Committing the Crime, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ 409 (1997).
" See, for example, Barkan v Amsted Industries, Inc, 567 A2d 1279, 1288 (Del 1989)
(using the standards listed above). Other criteria will likely apply as well. For instance,
the court will also consider whether the board effectively canvassed the market for alter-
native offers before approving the buyout and whether all material facts were disclosed to
shareholders when the buyout was presented for their approval. See Braunschweiger v
American Home Shield Corp, 15 Del J Corp L 997, 1008-09, 1011 (Del Chanc 1989); In re
Fort Howard Corp, 14 Del J Corp L 699, 720, 724-25 (Del Chanc 1988).
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able relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk of
nonconsummation; the basic shareholder interests at stake; the
bidder's identity, prior background, and other business venture
experiences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation
and their effects on shareholder interests."
Even if all corporate fiduciaries hold the same estimates of
their potential liability, differences in their individual preferences
will cause their behavior to vary. When the law is determinate,
sanctions can be set high enough to deter fiduciaries from under-
complying with legal requirements. And because there is no risk
that a sanction will be imposed on fiduciaries who comply with
the law, there is no reason for them to overcomply either. By con-
trast, when the law is indeterminate, the probability of liability is
always positive and increases incrementally with movement to-
ward undesirable behavior. Consequently, fiduciaries with lower
utility from engaging in the regulated behavior, or higher disu-
tility from sanctions, restrain their behavior more than others. In
the management buyout hypothetical discussed earlier, for ex-
ample, fiduciaries offer premiums over the share price such that
their marginal utility from lowering the premium equals their
marginal disutility from increasing their legal exposure. As legal
indeterminacy increases, the probability of liability becomes less
sensitive to changes in premiums, and the premiums offered by
any two fiduciaries with different utility functions further di-
verge. Thus, it is impossible to induce uniform fiduciary behavior.
The divergence of behavior from the social optimum as a re-
sult of legal indeterminacy is costly. 9 Consider the management
"S See Mills Acquisition Co v Macmillan, Inc, 559 A2d 1261, 1282 n 29 (Del 1989). The
list of relevant criteria for contested management buyouts does not end here. It is also
relevant, for instance, to evaluate whether the board treated management and other bid-
ders evenhandedly. See id at 1285.
" I assume here that the mean of the distribution representing the legal standard is
at the social optimum. Whether judge-made law in general converges with the social opti-
mum is an open question. See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J Legal Stud 235 (1979) (concluding that inefficient case
law may be resistant to change); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Se-
lection of Efficient Rules, 6 J Legal Stud 65 (1977) (arguing that over time case law is
bound to reach an efficient outcome). In corporate law, the answer should depend on one's
view of the effectiveness of state competition in improving the law. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L J 663 (1974) (ar-
guing that competition is destructive); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Pro-
tection, and the Theory of the Firm, 6 J Legal Stud 251 (1977) (arguing that competition is
constructive). Paul Mahoney argues that the need to clarify the law through litigation
arises only when parties learn from the court what behavior is optimal, but not when the
court only enforces optimal behavior already known to the parties. See Mahoney, 66 U Chi
L Rev at 925-26 (cited in note 3). To my mind, legal clarity is valuable in both situations.
Fiduciary duties are designed to compel corporate fiduciaries to behave optimally despite
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buyout hypothetical. Assume again that price is the only criterion
for determining the propriety of management buyouts and that a
particular premium would be socially optimal in a certain buyout.
Because the law does not announce that premium as the thresh-
old of liability, corporate fiduciaries must estimate the threshold
based upon past interpretations of the legal standard. Those who
underestimate it choose a lower premium, thereby harming
shareholders. Those who overestimate it may forgo the buyout al-
together to avoid harming themselves.' Consequently, more un-
derpriced than overpriced management buyouts take place in the
market, causing stock prices to decline.21
Legal indeterminacy also gives rise to risk-bearing costs. In a
world of costless monetary sanctions, the disutility to directors
and officers from paying damages would not present a social con-
cern. Every dollar they paid in damages would be collected by
plaintiffs, keeping social welfare fixed. But sanctions are not cost-
less in the real world because directors and officers may well be
risk averse, especially when they stand to lose large amounts of
money relative to their personal wealth.22 Consequently, every
dollar they lose in court is worth more than a dollar to them.' As
their self-serving inclinations. Clarification of the legal standard through litigation is nec-
essary to inform fiduciaries not about the socially optimal behavior-which they may
know already-but rather about the behavior required of them by law. Since the legal re-
quirement constrains their behavior, clarifyring this requirement will lead their behavior
to converge to the mean of the legal standard, which is assumed to be set optimally.
" Management buyouts can increase firm value in a number of ways. See Ronald J.
Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 404-29
(Foundation 2d ed 1995) (reviewing the literature). Suppose that the firm's current mar-
ket capitalization is $70 million, but that its true value is $100 million before the buyout
and $120 million after the buyout. In the absence of a rule announcing $100 million as an
adequate offer price, fiduciaries who underestimate the adequate price will offer share-
holders less than that amount. Fiduciaries who overestimate it will proceed with the buy-
out only if they believe the adequate price to be lower than $120 million.
" The problem is similar to that analyzed in Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan,
The "Lemons Effect" in Corporate Freeze-Outs, in Randall K. Morek, ed, Concentrated Cor-
porate Ownership (Chicago forthcoming 1999), available online at <http://nberws.nber.org/
papers/w6938> (visited Apr 12, 1999). The general framework of the problem is set out in
George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970). This result is not unique to management buyouts. It is es-
sentially the same in freezeout mergers, self-dealing, usurpation of corporate opportuni-
ties, or other transactions prone to managerial conflict of interest.
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U Chi L Rev 611, 640-41 (1985); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Li-
ability, 93 Yale L J 1231, 1235-36 (1984).
See Polinsky and Shavell, 69 Am Econ Rev at 888 (cited in note 5). Risk-bearing
costs may be even higher because plaintiffs' attorneys bear risk as well and are limited in
their ability to diversify that risk by forming large law firms that can handle numerous
suits. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 Colum L Rev 669, 705-11 (1986). Every dollar they receive in fees may thus be worth
1999]
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legal indeterminacy increases and the variance of trial outcomes
grows, so too does this loss.24 Although initially borne by corpo-
rate fiduciaries, the cost of liability risk does not rest with them.
At least in part, it is passed on to shareholders in a number of
ways. First, it manifests itself in the escalation of executive and
board compensation, as well as in the refusal of able individuals
to serve on boards.' Second, directors and officers may spend
large amounts of shareholder money on expensive legal advice in
order to minimize their risk.' Third, it provokes excessive cau-
tion in business decisionmaking, which is particularly problem-
atic because very little can be done to prevent it. Even ex ante
compensation for bearing liability risk fails, because officers and
directors will still try to reduce the risk ex post by being overly
cautious.'
B. Low and Frequent Sanctions as a Response to Indeterminacy
Classic deterrence theory treats the severity of sanctions and
the frequency of enforcement as alternative policy tools for regu-
lating behavior.28 Legal sanctions force individuals contemplating
undesirable behavior to weigh their potential liability against
their private benefit from that behavior. They will engage in the
controlled activity only to the extent that their private benefit ex-
ceeds their expected disutility from liability (which equals their
disutility from the possible sanctions multiplied by the probabil-
ity of incurring the sanctions).' In principle, numerous combina-
less than a dollar to them.
2 This analysis evaluates conservatively the increase in risk-bearing costs as a result
of greater uncertainty. In practice, risk-bearing costs increase even more because at some
point greater uncertainty begins to reduce deterrence, and so sanctions must increase in
order to keep the mean managerial behavior from shifting. See Craswell and Calfee, 2 J L
Econ & Org at 298-99 (cited in note 14).
See Michael Bradley and Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 Iowa L Rev 1, 35 n 219 (1989) (collecting numerous
news reports documenting the resignation of directors in response to unavailability of 1i-
ability insurance in the 1980s).
See Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 605 (cited in note 8) (arguing that risk-averse individu-
als avail themselves of legal advice to reduce the uncertainty that open-ended standards
entail).
See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Con-
trols, 93 Yale L J 857, 865 (1984).
See Becker, 76 J Pol Econ 169 (cited in note 5).
Because damages in fiduciary lawsuits are largely covered by shareholder-fimded
insurance and indemnification, the purpose of these suits cannot be to compensate share-
holders for damages caused by corporate fiduciaries, but rather to deter wrongdoing and
develop the law. See Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on
the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 Cornell L Rev 322, 327 (1986); Coffee, 86
Colum L Rev at 692-93 (cited in note 23).
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tions of sanction and enforcement levels can achieve the same de-
terrent effect. Monetary sanctions, for example, can be as low as
a few pennies or as high as the entire personal wealth of defen-
dants. The rate of law enforcement can vary from bringing to
court a few wrongdoers to bringing to court as many as can be de-
tected. But while frequent enforcement and severe sanctions are
in principle alternative ways to deter wrongdoers, in practice en-
forcement is often more costly. As long as sanctions are less costly
than enforcement, optimal enforcement policy combines the high-
est sanction defendants can bear with low enforcement. While the
level of deterrence remains unchanged, it is achieved at minimum
cost.
The indeterminacy that characterizes corporate law, how-
ever, introduces another variable into the pure deterrence calcu-
lus and alters its result. Given indeterminacy, enforcement
serves not only as a deterrent, but also as a means to clarify the
law. Enforcement is the engine for generating case law. As de-
cided cases accumulate, fiduciary standards become clearer.
Every court decision applies the standards to a specific factual
scenario and sheds additional light on their meaning.' This does
not mean that indeterminacy ever disappears. The elucidation of
corporate law through adjudication is a never-ending process.
New uncertainties quickly replace resolved ones, as the dynamic
nature of the corporate world constantly poses new legal ques-
tions to be answered." While it is futile to hope for the elimina-
tion of legal uncertainty in a standard-based regime, a steady
flow of lawsuits is rather necessary to keep certainty from de-
creasing."
" See note 8 and accompanying text. For an illustration of the process by which prece-
dents make concrete standards in the context of management buyouts, see Edward B.
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L Rev
1009, 1022-63 (1997). The analysis here extends previous scholarship that acknowledged
the value of litigation as a means of reducing uncertainty. That literature argued that in-
frequent law enforcement may lead individuals to miscalculate both the level of enforce-
ment and the magnitude of sanctions. See Bebchuk and Kaplow, 21 J Legal Stud at 366
(cited in note 16); Ben-Shahar, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ at 410 (cited in note 16). But even if
corporate fiduciaries have accurate information on the level of enforcement and the mag-
nitude of sanctions, litigation can be cost effective as a means of informing them about the
very content of their legal obligations to shareholders.
See Landes and Posner, 19 J L & Econ at 263 (cited in note 8) (arguing that prece-
dents depreciate over time and become obsolete).
"The incremental process by which litigation develops the law is consistent with the
failure of some empirical studies to discern any effects of major appellate decisions handed
down in Delaware on share price of Delaware firms. See Elliott J. Weiss and Lawrence J.
White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to 'Changes"
in Corporate Law, 75 Cal L Rev 551 (1987); Bradley and Schipani, 75 Iowa L Rev at 59
(cited in note 25). Delaware's reliance on legal standards makes it very difficult to gener-
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Naturally, not all cases add the same amount of certainty to
the system. In fact, most cases settle without proceeding to final
judgment. But while this may seem to undercut the value of re-
lying on enforcement to reduce uncertainty, its effect is not as
substantial as it first appears. First, all settlements of share-
holder lawsuits must be approved by the court. In Delaware, this
process involves a close judicial inspection of the proposed settle-
ment on its merits.' While possibly less detailed and authorita-
tive than court decisions after full trial, written opinions in set-
tlement proceedings do serve to clarify the law. 4 Even written
opinions from earlier trial stages can provide important legal
guidance. Settlements often follow denial of motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment, in which the court opines about
the strength of the case and sets valuable guidelines for future
behaviol' Second, both decided cases and settled cases can re-
duce legal uncertainty indirectly by honing the skills of judges
and attorneys." Experienced judges apply legal standards in a
more principled manner than do uninitiated judges. Veteran trial
attorneys predict legal outcomes better than do unseasoned ones.
Even cases that settle mid-trial contribute to those skills and
thus are valuable. Third, while settlements may be less effective
than full trials in clarifying the law, they are also less expensive:
they obviate the need to hear witnesses, involve lower damage
alize from individual court decisions to predict the future course of the law. Only the ag-
gregate of numerous precedents indicates legal trends. See Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1098
(cited in note 30); Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis:
A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 Cal L Rev 1015, 1035-38 (1988); William T. Allen, Law
and Markets as Social Products, in Arnold W. Sametz and James L. Bicksler, eds, The
Battle for Corporate Control 148-49 (Irwin 1991). The expectation that this aggregate will
continue to grow is already reflected in share prices.
' See, for example, Zapata Corp u Maldonado, 430 A2d 779, 788 (Del 1981).
"See, for example, Barkan v Amsted Industries, Inc, 567 A2d 1279 (Del 1989); Polk v
Good, 507 A2d 531 (Del 1986); In re Caremark Inc Derivative Litigation, 698 A2d 959 (Del
Chanc 1996); In re MAXXAM, 659 A2d 760 (Del Chanc 1995); In re Vitalink Communica-
tions Corp Shareholders Litigation, 17 Del J Corp L 1311 (Del Chanc 1991); Stepak u Trac-
inda Corp, 15 Del J Corp L 750 (Del Chanc 1989); In Re Maxxam Group, Inc Stockholders
Litigation, 13 Del J Corp L 324 (Del Chanc 1987).
"See, for example, Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805 (Del 1984); Zapata, 430 A2d 779.
See also Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1097 (cited in note 30) (arguing that fiduciary duty law
evolves incrementally even through court decisions that do not produce a legal rule).
"See Kamar, 98 Colum L Rev at 1935 (cited in note 4) (discussing the maintenance of
judicial proficiency through adjudication); Colin F. Camerer, Progress in Behavioral Game
Theory, 11 J Econ Persp 167 (1997) (illustrating the point in the context of game theory);
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale
L J 353, 381-82 (1988) (reviewing the literature on learning to assess risk through experi-
ence); Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 52
Vand L Rev 1765, 1784 (1998) (arguing that specialized lawyers improve the accuracy of
their risk assessments by learning from their mistakes).
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awards, and induce fewer litigant expenditures. Hence, particu-
larly when final decisions are scarce, the value of each additional
decision may justify the cost of the suits that settle.'
In addition to inducing optimal behavior by clarifying the
law, frequent enforcement combined with low sanctions also re-
duces risk-bearing costs. Legal indeterminacy creates an omni-
present risk of liability." While corporate fiduciaries can limit
their legal exposure by altering their behavior, they can never
eliminate it. They do not know whether they will be sued, and
cannot foretell the outcome of a suit if it is brought. To the extent
that corporate fiduciaries are risk averse, their disutility from
this uncertainty exceeds their expected sanctions and thus consti-
tutes a deadweight loss to society. This loss can be mitigated by
reducing sanctions below the maximum that corporate fiduciaries
can bear while increasing the frequency of enforcement.39 Uncer-
tainty is lower when its only source is legal indeterminacy than
See Romano, 7 JL Econ & Org at 85 (cited in note 3). I discuss below the costs of en-
forcement and possible ways of discouraging settlements. See Parts IIIA and III.C.
3 Most state laws permit limitation or elimination of directorial (but not managerial)
personal liability for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care. See Olson and
Hatch, Director and Officer Liability § 1.07[11-[2] at 1-37-1-48 (cited in note 1); American
Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§ 7.19 at 256-58 (1994). The Delaware statute, for example, allows shareholders to excul-
pate directors from certain types of liability in the certificate of incorporation. See 8 Del
Code Ann § 102(bX7) (1991). None of these statutes, however, applies to the duty of loyalty
or to various other exceptions. Because the distinction between the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care is not always clear, the primary effect of these statutes is to encourage plain-
tiffs to couch claims for monetary damages in terms of one of the statute's exceptions. See,
for example, Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, and Stephen A. Radin, The Business
Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 110 (Prentice Hall 4th ed 1993),
and the sources cited therein. For a recent example of how such mixed claims, combined
with disclosure claims, can survive a motion for summary judgment despite the existence
of exculpation provisions in the certificate of incorporation, see Emerald Partners v Berlin,
726 A2d 1215 (Del 1999).
"Reducing sanctions while increasing the rate of enforcement can also alleviate li-
ability risk when the law is clear but some individuals, whose private gain from violating
the law exceeds the expected sanction (which is set equal to the social cost of their behav-
ior), are not deterred and face uncertain enforcement. See Polinsky and Shavell, 69 Am
Econ Rev 880 (cited in note 5). Legal indeterminacy, however, is an additional source of li-
ability risk, which constitutes an independent reason to reduce sanctions and increase the
rate of enforcement. Note that this explanation differs from the standard treatment of li-
ability insurance and indemnification as a response to legal uncertainty. Previous com-
mentators have noted that director and officer liability insurance and indemnification can
shift liability risk from risk-averse fiduciaries to diversified shareholders. See Parry and
Parry, 58 J Risk & Ins 30 (cited in note 7); Kraakman, 93 Yale L J at 864-67 (cited in note
27) (arguing that insurance for acts of management serves to shift liability risk from man-
agers to shareholders). Risk shifting, however, requires that managerial compensation re-
flect the expected cost of liability. This requirement is not borne out in the existing em-
pirical evidence. See note 3. The decoupling rationale does not imply a similar require-
ment. Rather than shifting the risk to shareholders, decoupling reduces the risk fiduciar-
ies bear by making sanctions more frequent and less severe.
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when it is also unknown who will fall within the sample of corpo-
rate fiduciaries that are sued. Since the two risks are not nega-
tively correlated, reducing one of them by increasing the occur-
rence of litigation lowers overall liability risk. The degree to
which enforcement should be raised and sanctions reduced de-
pends on the level of legal indeterminacy. Because risk-bearing
costs are higher when legal indeterminacy is greater, the benefit
of reducing sanctions and increasing enforcement is also greater
in this context.
II. ACHIEVING OPTMAL ENFORCEMENT THROUGH
DECOUPLED LIABILITY
Having identified how a combination of frequent lawsuits
and lenient sanctions can serve the socially valuable goals of in-
creasing determinacy in corporate law and reducing legal risk,
the discussion now turns to the implementation of this enforce-
ment policy. The central difficulty is similar to that presented by
the traditional policy of combining maximum sanctions and
minimum enforcement: The amount of damages that optimally
deters defendants' misconduct will not necessarily prompt the
proper level of litigation by plaintiffs. The solution in both cases
is to decouple liability-to separate the damages defendants pay
from the awards plaintiffs collect-so that sanctions and en-
forcement can be adjusted separately. In corporate law, where
frequent enforcement and low sanctions are desirable, insurance
and indemnification performs the necessary decoupling by al-
lowing plaintiffs to collect more than what defendants pay.
A. Standard and Reverse Decoupling
Consider first the traditional policy of combining minimal en-
forcement with maximal sanctions. Achieving this is straightfor-
ward in criminal law, where enforcement is conducted by the
government. The intensity of law enforcement in this case is a
matter of prosecutorial discretion, and the magnitude of sanc-
tions can be controlled by legislation. Clearly, the government
can adjust one without altering the other.
It is more difficult to pursue a similar enforcement policy in
civil law because the frequency of enforcement is directly con-
trolled by the magnitude of damage awards, and so imposing high
monetary sanctions on defendants also induces plaintiffs to sue.
The solution to this problem is to break the tie between the mag-
nitude of sanctions and the level of enforcement, and to award
plaintiffs an amount of money different from what defendants
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pay.4" While defendants should pay as much as they can afford,
plaintiffs should receive whatever is needed to induce them to sue
frequently enough to create the desired deterrent effect. Although
in principle plaintiffs might need to receive either less or more
than what defendants pay, the literature treats the latter possi-
bility as more theoretical than real. The focus on awarding plain-
tiffs less than what defendants pay is not surprising. It follows
from the assumption that defendants should always pay the
highest damages possible. The only reason to award plaintiffs
more than that amount is that failing to do so would result in in-
sufficient litigation. The circumstances in which awarding plain-
tiffs the entire personal wealth of defendants would result in too
little litigation are not common.
Just like the combination of low enforcement and high sanc-
tions, the combination of frequent enforcement and lenient sanc-
tions can readily be achieved when law enforcement is entrusted
to public authorities. Public enforcers are not motivated by the
pecuniary profits they may gain from litigation, but rather by
policy goals and institutional incentives. Indeed, criminal law en-
forcement is based almost exclusively on sanctions that do not di-
rectly benefit law enforcement authorities. It is more difficult to
combine lenient sanctions with frequent enforcement, however,
when enforcement is entrusted to individual plaintiffs. Unlike
paid prosecutors, private plaintiffs will file suit only if they expect
to collect damages high enough to recover their expenses. If dam-
ages were paid exclusively by defendants, any increase in en-
forcement could be brought about only by an increase in sanc-
tions.4 1
Insurance and indemnification can provide a solution to the
problem by enabling courts to compensate plaintiffs and their at-
' See Polinsky and Che, 22 RAND J Econ 562 (cited in note 6); Warren F. Schwartz,
An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 Georgetown L J 1075, 1092-96
(1980).
" The analysis here does not apply to suits for injunction brought by bidders against
the boards of target companies in the course of battles for corporate control, since bidders
are sufficiently motivated to sue by the prospect of acquiring the target. Indeed, courts
deny such plaintiffs reimbursement for their trial expenditures precisely for this reason.
See In re Dunkin" Donuts Shareholders Litigation, 16 Del J Corp L 1443, 1458-61 (Del
Chanc 1990). However, the law on hostile takeovers can also develop through suits for an
injunction or damages brought by unaffiliated shareholders. See, for example, Gilbert v El
Paso Co, 575 A2d 1131 (Del 1989); Citron v Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp, 569
A2d 53 (Del 1989); Moran v Household International, Inc, 500 A2d 1346 (Del 1985); Po-
gostin v Rice, 480 A2d 619 (Del 1984); Tomczak v Morton Thiokol, Inc, 16 Del J Corp L 924
(Del Chanc 1990); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc Shareholders Litigation, 14 Del J Corp L 1132
(Del Chanc 1989). In these cases, the prospect of gaining control over the firm as an incen-
tive to sue is absent, and so litigation depends on compensating plaintiffs for their expen-
ditures.
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torneys for the considerable expenses of corporate litigation with-
out imposing the full cost of the litigation on defendants as a
sanction.42 In contrast to the situation where maximum sanctions
are optimal, however, in the present context it is easy to see the
need for awarding plaintiffs more than what defendants pay. It is
more likely that plaintiffs will face weak incentives to sue when
defendants pay far less than they can afford. 3
Although insurance and indemnification provides complete
protection only from duty of care liability, its decoupling effect
spans the spectrum of fiduciary duties. Insurance policies ordi-
narily exclude from coverage the receipt of personal profit or ad-
vantage to which to the insured was not legally entitled." But not
all breaches of fiduciary duty other than the duty of care fall un-
der this exclusion. For example, a dominated board that approves
managerial self-dealing in which it has no direct interest may be
in breach of its duty of loyalty, and yet be insured. Similarly, both
management and the board may run afoul of the duty of loyalty
by not disclosing material information relevant to the approval of
otherwise fair self-dealing, and still be covered by insurance.
Furthermore, the line between loyalty and care issues is of-
ten murky, particularly at the early stage when the claim is filed.
It is commonplace for plaintiffs to assert facts that give rise to
both claims at once in order to avoid dismissal due to exculpation
statutes.45 Insurers routinely cover settlements of such mixed,
" One indication of the cost of bringing fiduciary claims can be found in a study of the
fifteen management buyout cases brought in Delaware between 1981 and 1990. In these
cases, plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded a total of $17.2 million. See Rock, 44 UCLA L
Rev at 1094, 1099 (cited in note 30). A sample of twenty-nine derivative actions brought
from the late 1960s through 1987 against directors and officers of public corporations pro-
vides a more conservative estimate. Attorneys' fees in this sample averaged $394,771. See
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation 27 (Yale Law
School Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper No 130,
Mar 1990). Last, fees awarded to plaintiffs' attorneys in ninety-eight settlements of corpo-
rate class or derivative actions brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery between July
1, 1989 and December 31, 1991 ranged from $15,000 to $12 million. In twenty of those
cases, the fees awarded exceeded $1 million. See Carolyn Berger and Darla Pomeroy, Set-
tlement fever: How a Delaware court tackles its cases, 2 Bus L Today 7, 9 (Sept 1992).
"Importantly, in addition to defraying the cost of bringing fiduciary claims, insurance
and indemnification also defrays the cost of defending these suits, which may be even
higher. See Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 65 (cited in note 3); Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at
701-02 (cited in note 23). In a sample of 154 shareholder fiduciary claims that closed be-
tween 1989 and 1998, the average defense cost was $1.3 million in addition to the cost of
representation by in-house counsel. See Mark W. Larsen, Directors & Officers Liability
Survey: 1998 Results and Historical Trends 28 (unpublished presentation materials)
(Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Mar 1999).
"See Olson and Hatch, Director and Officer Liability § 10.0615][a] at 10-28 (cited in
note 1).
"Exculpation statutes limit or eliminate directorial liability for breach of the duty of
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hard-to-categorize fiduciary claims in order to save the costs of
protracted litigation. Indeed, when settlement of the fiduciary
claims also releases related securities class actions, the willing-
ness to extend insurance coverage is even greater. The same is
true for indemnification. State laws that permit indemnification
typically restrict it to situations that do not raise loyalty issues.
Settling the claim, however, avoids determination of whether the
restriction applies. Thus, even breaches of fiduciary duty that af-
ter trial may be excluded from coverage are potentially covered ex
ante for purposes of calculating expected liability.
Notably, the effectiveness of insurance and indemnification
as a decoupling mechanism owes itself to the notorious agency
relationship between shareholders and the attorneys who repre-
sent them in court." Because the attorneys do not share the cost
of insurance and indemnification, payment from that source is a
net gain for them and an incentive to sue. Were the interests of
attorneys aligned with those of the shareholders they represent,
attorneys would also consider the cost of insurance and indemni-
fication and, consequently, would not regard recovery from insur-
ance and indemnification as an incentive to sue. The presence of
transaction costs would always render the cost of insurance and
indemnification higher than their benefit, and attorneys inter-
nalizing both would refrain from filing suits."
care only. See note 38.
" Insurance and indemnification covers not only awards paid to shareholders but also
attorney fees. See Goodrich v E.F. Hutton Group, Inc, 681 A2d 1039 (Del 1996). This is key
to the effectiveness of insurance and indemnification as a tool for decoupling liability be-
cause shareholder suits are controlled by attorneys rather than shareholders. See Marcel
Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, Special Levies on Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency
Problems, and Litigation Expenditures, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ 175 (1995) (arguing that de-
coupled liability should focus on the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys when agency con-
cerns are present).
", See Charles J. Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit:
Not Proven, 71 Cornell L Rev 344, 348 (1986) (arguing that entrusting derivative litigation
to representative plaintiffs presents a credible threat to sue aberrant directors and offi-
cers). Diversified shareholders could theoretically capture the benefits to all firms from
lawmaking and sue optimally. Experience with diversified institutional investors indi-
cates, however, that collective action problems tend to chill any shareholder activism the
benefits of which are shared by all firms. See, for example, Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Georgetown L J 445,
453-78 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum L Rev 1277, 1317-28, 1342-45 (1991); Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich L Rev 520, 523 (1990). Furthermore, even if
shareholders captured the entire benefit from lawmaking, they would not consider this
benefit when making litigation decisions. See Kraakman, Park, and Shavell, 82 George-
town L J at 1741, 1748, 1756 n 64 (cited in note 3) (making an analogous argument about
the benefit from deterrence).
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B. Insurance and Indemnification Versus State
Subsidies to Plaintiffs
To decouple liability for the purpose of encouraging litigation
is essentially to subsidize litigation. In general, subsidies to
plaintiffs can come from any source. One possible source can be
taxpayer money. Subsidies from this source could take the direct
form of awarding supplemental payments to winning plaintiffs or
the indirect form of supporting the court system using public
funds." Corporate law does not rely on public funding to subsi-
dize litigation, but rather imposes the cost of litigation on share-
holders through the mechanism of liability insurance and indem-
nification. Firms that use the law more often through their in-
volvement in lawsuits pay higher insurance premiums and spend
more on indemnification, thus contributing more to the develop-
ment of the system.
In principle, imposing this cost on shareholders can be effi-
cient in that it compels them, as consumers of corporate law, to
pay for its maintenance.49 Whether it is efficient in practice de-
pends on whether the indeterminacy that warrants such mainte-
nance could be avoided. Some indeterminacy is probably inescap-
able in view of the relational context of the corporate contract. °
But does the current level of indeterminacy in the law represent
no more than this minimum? I remain skeptical. One point is
clear, however. The competition among states in providing corpo-
rate law gives no assurance that the current level of indetermi-
nacy in state law is optimal. Since the market for corporate law is
imperfectly competitive, it can easily sustain excessive indeter-
minacy.5 If indeterminacy in corporate law is too high, share-
holders who internalize its cost shoulder an unnecessary burden
that their economic activity did not create. And if that is the case,
' See Polinsky and Che, 22 RAND J Econ at 563 (cited in note 6) (suggesting supple-
mental payments); Landes and Posner, 19 J L & Econ at 272 (cited in note 8) (suggesting
government support of the court system).
" Previous scholarship has acknowledged the value of imposing the state's litigation
costs on plaintiffs. See Shavell, 26 J Legal Stud at 587 (cited in note 15); Rex E. Lee, The
American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 Cath U L
Rev 267 (1985); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis, and Reform 136 (Harvard
1985). Director and officer liability insurance and indemnification goes further by impos-
ing the full costs of developing and maintaining corporate law on its users.
" See Klausner, 81 Va L Rev at 775-76 & n 60 (cited in note 8). Independent of
whether indeterminacy could be avoided, some argue that it can in fact be helpful in pre-
venting management from circumventing the law. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of
Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal
Minimum Standards, 8 Cardozo L Rev 759, 766 (1987).
" See Kamar, 98 Colum L Rev at 1919-23 (cited in note 4). See also the discussion in
Part ]II.E of this Article.
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even if insurance and indemnification is an efficient response to
indeterminacy, it can at most be a second-best solution, inferior
to the adoption of more determinate law. Whether current insur-
ance and indemnification practices are in fact such an efficient
response is a question I shall turn to next.
III. Is DECOUPLING EFFICIENT IN PRACTICE?
That liability insurance and indemnification can be desirable
given indeterminate law does not mean that it is so as practiced
today. Among the relevant considerations in this regard are the
cost of enforcement, the possibility that legal uncertainty in itself
spurs enough litigation, the extent to which insurance and in-
demnification induces settlements, and the adequacy of deter-
rence under the current legal regime. Below I analyze each of
these factors.
A. The Cost of Enforcement
The analysis thus far has presented only the benefits of re-
ducing sanctions and increasing enforcement of corporate law.
Optimal enforcement, however, balances benefits against costs.
Specifically, enforcement should be increased only insofar as its
marginal cost is lower than its marginal benefit.2 In principle,
this optimum can be anywhere. On one extreme, if the marginal
cost of enforcement is always higher than its marginal benefit in
clarifying the law and reducing liability risk, the optimum will be
reached when enforcement is minimal. In this case, there will be
no advantage in decoupling liability through insurance and in-
demnification. On the other extreme, if the marginal cost of en-
forcement is always lower than its marginal benefit, the optimum
will be reached when enforcement is maximal. In this case, li-
ability should be decoupled completely, resulting in numerous
lawsuits and minuscule participation of defendants in payment of
damages.
" Naturally, increased enforcement produces both meritorious and nonmeritorious
lawsuits. See Mahoney, 66 U Chi L Rev at 927-28 (cited in note 3). However, either type of
lawsuit develops the law, and both reduce liability risk. See, for example, Rock, 44 UCLA
L Rev at 1098 (cited in note 30) (showing that because even defense victories are valuable
in clarifying the law, fees for plaintiff victories should be sufficiently high to motivate
bringing cases that might be lost). It would be ideal to increase only the number of merito-
rious lawsuits, but to the extent that nonmeritorious lawsuits are filed due to plaintiffs'
misconception of the legal standard, selective encouragement of only meritorious lawsuits
is impossible. Nevertheless, requiring defendants to contribute to settlement payments
could motivate them to defend their position more vigorously and so discourage nonmeri-
torious lawsuits. See text accompanying notes 62-64.
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The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Whereas the
marginal cost of enforcement is initially lower than its marginal
benefit, this relationship eventually reverses. The social optimum
is located where the two are equal. At this point, more than the
minimum number of suits is brought, and defendants personally
bear more than the minimum amount of sanctions. The logic be-
hind this conjecture is twofold. First, the marginal cost of en-
forcement likely increases as enforcement increases. Law en-
forcement requires an initial fixed investment in legal infrastruc-
ture. The basic investment in establishing a court system and le-
gal services is the same whether few or many suits are filed
thereafter. After the initial investment has been made, the mar-
ginal cost associated with any additional suit is relatively low.
The cost to a trained judge of handling two lawsuits is not much
higher than the cost of handling one. Similarly, a lawyer with an
established corporate practice can litigate a second lawsuit with-
out having to reacquire the legal knowledge he acquired to liti-
gate the first. However, the marginal cost of enforcement is not
constant. Because the least costly suits are brought first, the cost
of litigation per suit increases as more suits are brought.' While
initially low, the marginal cost of enforcement gradually esca-
lates, and may eventually equal the benefit from further in-
creases in enforcement.
Second, the marginal benefit from enforcement is likely to
decrease as enforcement increases. Consider first the value of en-
forcement as a means of clarifying the law. When the level of liti-
gation is low, any additional lawsuit reduces legal uncertainty,
both by producing decisions and by training judges and lawyers.
As cases accumulate, however, the contribution to legal certainty
made by each additional case diminishes. The probability that a
new case will address an unanswered question decreases, as ex-
isting case law is likely to address commonly encountered sce-
narios.
The marginal benefit from reducing risk-bearing costs should
also decline as enforcement increases. Insofar as enforcement re-
duces legal uncertainty, high levels of enforcement correlate with
Compare Bebchuk and Kaplow, 21 J Legal Stud at 367 (cited in note 16). The argu-
ment in the text assumes that the increase in the marginal cost of enforcement outweighs
any decrease in that cost due to economies of scale. In fact, it is enough to assume that
even if economies of scale are initially substantial, they gradually decline. This assump-
tion is very plausible. As litigation increases, lawyers and judges gain expertise, and the
law becomes less uncertain and hence less costly to litigate. But all these effects, which
reduce the marginal cost of enforcement, become less significant as the volume of litiga-
tion continues to grow.
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low levels of uncertainty. Low levels of legal uncertainty in turn
impose only moderate risk-bearing costs on corporate fiduciaries,
and hence there is less utility in further reducing these costs.'
Furthermore, the low sanctions that accompany high levels of en-
forcement render individual managerial risk-bearing costs rela-
tively insensitive to additional increases in enforcement and de-
creases in sanctions.
B. Legal Uncertainty as an Insufficient Inducement
for Litigation
Having established that legal indeterminacy warrants fre-
quent enforcement with low sanctions, one should still inquire
whether insurance and indemnification is necessary to achieve
this goal in practice or whether legal uncertainty itself spurs suf-
ficient litigation. Just as uncertainty leads to disagreement be-
tween different defendants, the argument would go, it also leads
to disagreement between defendants and plaintiffs. This, in turn,
results in more disputes proceeding to trial without settling.' Op-
timal enforcement may thus be achieved with no need for decou-
pling.'
The question, however, is whether legal indeterminacy alone
can induce sufficient litigation. Assuming that damages today are
set optimally, they would have to be significantly lower in the ab-
sence of insurance and indemnification lest deterrence be too
high. Given such low damages, it is far from clear that the pro-
pensity to sue would be sufficient. To take an extreme case, if
damages were lower than the cost of bringing a suit, no diver-
gence of expectations would suffice to induce litigation. ' An indi-
cation that decoupling liability through insurance and indemnifi-
cation is necessary to induce litigation notwithstanding the di-
vergence of litigant expectations due to uncertainty is the rela-
tively low number of fiduciary claims brought today, when both of
these factors affect lawsuit filings. All accounts on this matter
point to the same conclusion. While figuring prominently in the
Compare text accompanying notes 26-27.
See Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J Econ Lit 1067, 1092 (1989); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement,
and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 55, 63 n 36 (1982); Posner, 2 J Legal Stud 399 (cited in note 15).
" See Landes and Posner, 19 J L & Econ at 269-72 (cited in note 8) (modeling sponta-
neous replenishment of depreciated case law as a result of growing legal uncertainty,
which triggers litigation).
" See id at 273-74 (arguing that litigation subsidies may be needed to prevent under-
production of precedents when litigants' reservation price is lower than the cost of adjudi-
cation).
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media, fiduciary claims are not a frequent event in the life of
firms.' In the absence of insurance and indemnification, their
frequency would be even lower.
C. The Pressure to Settle
Earlier I noted that the misalignment of interest between at-
torneys and the shareholders they represent makes insurance
and indemnification effective for inducing litigation. 9 However,
while self-interest drives attorneys to file suits where sharehold-
ers would not, it also leads them to settle many of those suits be-
fore they produce socially valuable precedents.' Indeed, it is the
very availability of insurance and indemnification that motivates
these settlements. Settling a claim relieves both plaintiffs' attor-
neys and defendants from the hazards of trial. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys who lose their cases in court receive no compensation for
their work. Defendants who are found liable for acts of dishonesty
or the receipt of personal profit or advantage to which they were
not legally entitled may be neither insured nor indemnified. Set-
tling a claim avoids both of these hazards.6'
But a high settlement rate is not an inevitable byproduct of
insurance and indemnification. Settlements could be discouraged
if defendants had to contribute to their payment.2 Indeed,
defendant participation in payment of settlement awards could
also prevent another undesirable effect of liability insurance and
See Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 59 (cited in note 3) (reporting 139 suits, both in
corporate and securities law, against a sample of 535 publicly traded corporations, from
the late 1960s through 1987); Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1090-94 (cited in note 30) (con-
trasting 15 Delaware management buyout cases with 404 leveraged buyouts of public
companies in the United States between 1981 and 1990). See also Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev
at 723-34 (cited in note 23) (opining that the current volume of shareholder litigation is
likely too low).
See notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
Settlements are certainly valuable in developing the law. See notes 33-37 and ac-
companying text. However, to the extent that their value is lower than that of trials, they
dilute the effectiveness of litigation as a vehicle of lawmaking and should not be encour-
aged.
01 See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 714-20 (cited in note 23).
Alternatively, settlements could be discouraged and trials encouraged if firms were
permitted to indemnify fiduciaries for damages and trial expenses even when held liable.
Just like mandatory participation of defendants in settlement awards, this would render
the choice between settling the claim and proceeding to trial less consequential for defend-
ants. However, compelling defendants to participate in settlement awards is preferable for
two reasons. First, it motivates defendants not only to proceed to trial but also to defend
their position vigorously and refrain from colluding with plaintiffs. Second, it preserves
the deterrent effects of the law, which could be upset by allowing indemnification of de-
fendants who were found liable. Another way of discouraging settlements could be to tax
them. However, a tax might fail to discourage settlements because defendants would
agree to higher settlement payments, knowing that they are fully covered.
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indemnification, namely the filing of frivolous suits solely for
their settlement value.' Plaintiffs' attorneys would probably be
more selective in bringing suits if they anticipated that defen-
dants would contest them vigorously. For now, however, the de-
sirability of defendants' participation in settlement payments
remains a theoretical question. In practice, insurers do not insist
on including personal coverage retention in insurance policies be-
cause they are equally compensated by company coverage reten-
tion." Similarly, whenever state law permits firms to indemnify
defendants, there is no limit on coverage. Mandating a minimum
personal coverage retention by law could fill this gap. But, as
with any intervention in the market, it is difficult to ascertain
what makes for optimal personal coverage retention and, indeed,
whether it should be mandated at all."
D. The Level of Deterrence
The prevalence of fully covered settlements under current in-
surance and indemnification practices also raises deterrence con-
cerns. The evidence on this issue is hardly conclusive. On the one
hand, it is clear that directors and officers routinely settle fiducia-
ry claims with complete insurance and indemnification cover-
age."6 Most corporations today purchase for their fiduciaries in-
surance that covers all their losses in suits that cannot be indem-
nified. Only 5 percent of the insurance policies today include per-
sonal coverage retention. In the absence of evidence showing
that fiduciaries' compensation reflects the cost of insurance," this
complete coverage may well result in underdeterrence. On the
other hand, both directors and officers face a higher turnover rate
See id.
A 1998 survey finds that 95 percent of the corporations purchasing director and offi-
cer liability insurance currently have no personal coverage deductible. The remainder
have a flat personal coverage deductible. A few insurance policies require the insured to
pay a percentage of the loss that exceeds the flat deductible. "This retention percentage is
usually either 0.5 percent or 5 percent, generally limited to the first $1 million of loss
above the flat deductible, and appears almost exclusively for New York corporations" pur-
suant to NY Bus Corp Law § 726(aX3), and 11 NY Comp Codes R & Regs tit 1, § 72 (1998).
These data reflect a trend toward eliminating personal coverage deductibles. Towers Per-
rin Liability Survey at 34 (cited in note 1). See also Olson and Hatch, Director and Officer
Liability § 10.06[7][a]-[b] at 10-43-10-48 (cited in note 1).
See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and Egg, De-
structive Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?, 72 Tex L Rev 1655, 1675 (1994) (discussing the dif-
ficulty regulators have calibrating the optimal level of insurance coverage); Kent D. Sy-
verud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 Tex L Rev 1629, 1652-53 (1994) (same).
See Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 84 (cited in note 3).
See note 64.
6 See note 3.
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after having been sued. 9 Also true, but difficult to quantify, is
that fiduciary claims inconvenience directors and officers and
harm their reputations."0 This disciplining effect is bolstered by
the vilifying tone that court decisions often employ when con-
demning a defendant's conduct.7 In a world of rapid information
flow and attentive media coverage, these sanctions can be effec-
tive. The same is true with respect to court decisions that precede
or approve settlements. These decisions also impact defendants'
reputations and thus have a deterrent effect."
E. State Competition as a Guarantor of Efficiency
As the foregoing discussion shows, it would be difficult to
measure whether corporate law addresses legal indeterminacy ef-
ficiently. First, it is not clear how to determine whether the reli-
ance on open-ended standards is optimal. Second, it is hard to
gauge whether current insurance and indemnification practices
respond to the resulting uncertainty efficiently.
These hurdles would be avoided if one could identify a mar-
ket mechanism that ensures optimality with no need of empirical
proof. The decision of shareholders to insure and indemnify cor-
porate fiduciaries clearly provides no such assurance. Sharehold-
ers of individual firms are not interested in producing precedents
for the entire shareholder community, and therefore do not cali-
brate insurance and indemnification to achieve this goal opti-
mally. But while shareholders cannot be trusted to adopt socially
optimal insurance and indemnification practices, perhaps state
See Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 71-80 (cited in note 3). For a recent example of
chief executive officer dismissal following a corporate lawsuit, see In re Louisiana-Pacific
Corp Derivative Litigation, 705 A2d 238, 239 (Del Chanc 1997).
70 See Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley, and Jeffrey L. Coles, Managerial Indemnifi-
cation and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54 J Risk & Ins 721,
726 (1987); Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 722 (cited in note 23) (arguing that the mere pen-
dency of an action may have various negative consequences for defendants).
' See Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1028-60 (cited in note 30) (analyzing Delaware cases);
Melvin A- Eisenberg, Corporate Law, Social Norms, and Belief Systems, 99 Colum L Rev
(forthcoming 1999).
n See Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1038-39, 1051-53, 1058-59 (cited in note 30) (citing
specific instances). See also William A. Sahiman, Why Sane People Shouldn't Serve on
Public Boards, 68 Harv Bus Rev 28, 30 (May-June 1990) (arguing that settling share-
holder lawsuits implies culpability and damages a director's reputation); Coffee, 86 Colum
L Rev at 718 (cited in note 23) (arguing that settling shareholder suits may damage the
reputation of directors and officers). Some support for the argument that overall deter-
rence under current corporate law is meaningful can be found in the fact that sharehold-
ers in the United States, more than in other countries, keep small holdings in firms with
no fear of being exploited by management. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J Pol Econ 1113
(1998).
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competition provides alternative theoretical grounds to believe
that the system is efficient. State corporate law, including the law
on insurance and indemnification, did not develop in a vacuum.
Rather, it developed against the backdrop of states actively com-
peting to attract incorporation by adjusting their laws to the
preferences of corporate decisionmakers. The current law that
allows most fiduciary claims to settle with full insurance and in-
demnification coverage is a product of this competition. Whatever
can be said about the desirability of the law that state competi-
tion produces in general should be applicable here as well.
Unfortunately, the implications of state competition for the
efficiency of current insurance and indemnification practices are
not much clearer than the implications for other aspects of corpo-
rate law. Take, for example, the deterrence issue. Those who view
state law as an outcome of destructive competition among states
to appease corporate fiduciaries 3 would likely treat the lack of
mandatory participation of defendants in settlement payments as
further proof of their claim that the law underdeters directors
and managers. Those who trust competition to breed optimal
law74 might also argue that full insurance and indemnification
coverage leaves just the level of deterrence that shareholders
want. As far as theory goes, either interpretation may be right.7"
State competition provides a more definite, but still incom-
plete, answer to the question whether the law on insurance and
indemnification induces optimal production of precedents. Com-
mentators generally agree that an important source of Delaware's
appeal is its developed corporate case law and experienced judici-
ary and bar.7" As a general matter, Delaware's desire to maintain
See, for example, Cary, 83 Yale L J 663 (cited in note 19).
7' See, for example, Winter, 6 J Legal Stud 251 (cited in note 19).
7' While either approach is theoretically sound, a hybrid of the two is tenuous. It
would be difficult to reconcile a favorable view of competition in corporate law with skepti-
cism about the deterrent value of claims under the law that competition has bred. For
criticism of corporate lawsuits by proponents of competition in corporate law, see Romano,
7 J L Econ & Org at 84 (cited in note 3) (arguing that "shareholder litigation is a weak, if
not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance"); Daniel R. Fischel and Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L Rev 261, 292 (1986) (arguing that the assump-
tion that "liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a fundamental role in aligning
the interests of managers and investors" is unsupportable).
" See Kamar, 98 Colum L Rev at 1923-27 (cited in note 4). For the comprehensiveness
of Delaware case law, see Kahan and Klausner, 83 Va L Rev 713 (cited in note 8); Klaus-
ner, 81 Va L Rev 757 (cited in note 8); Romano, 1 J L Econ & Org at 277-78 (cited in note
8). For the expertise of the courts and the bar, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Fu-
ture: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 Brooklyn L Rev 1,
5-8 (1995); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in
the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus Law 351 (1992).
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its appeal tends to ensure that the high settlement rate under its
insurance and indemnification law optimizes precedent produc-
tion. This assurance, however, is not perfect. First, even assum-
ing that current precedent production is optimal, it may not be
achieved at minimum cost. Arguably, if defendants had to par-
ticipate in settlement payments, their willingness to settle would
decline, as would the motivation of plaintiffs to sue. A body of
case law comparable to the one existing today could thus be de-
veloped at a lower cost. The reason why Delaware fails to do this
is likely political. Despite being inefficient for lawmaking, a mul-
titude of lawsuits and settlements benefits the local corporate bar
by generating legal fees and reducing the risks of litigation." Sec-
ond, in view of the lawyers' interest in settlements, there is no
assurance that current precedent production in itself is optimal.
Delaware lawyers gain when the rates of both litigation and set-
tlement are higher. Even if a lower settlement rate could acceler-
ate precedent production and lure additional firms and lawsuits
to Delaware, the bar may still prefer fewer firms and lawsuits, as
long as many of the lawsuits settle.
The final question that needs to be answered in order to de-
termine the overall efficiency of insurance and indemnification is
whether the very use of legal standards that rely on litigation is
optimal. There is little value in using litigation to address legal
indeterminacy if more determinate law could be formulated at a
lower cost. As in the case of precedent production, here too it is
not obvious that Delaware maintains its preeminence by offering
optimally determinate law. Given its dominant position in the
market for corporate chartering, Delaware may benefit from of-
fering overly indeterminate standards. Although excessive inde-
terminacy may reduce the absolute value of Delaware law, Dela-
ware's well-developed system of adjudication allows it to compen-
sate for some of this indeterminacy. And although other states
can copy Delaware's law, they cannot easily emulate its adjudica-
tory experience and keep up with its growing body of case law.
" See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex L Rev 469, 513-14 (1987). The argument that current
litigation practices do not minimize the cost of lawmaking relies on the assumption that
the cost-benefit ratio of settled claims is higher than that of adjudicated claims, and so
more adjudicated claims out of fewer filings could develop the law at a lower cost. In fact,
the interest group theory can support a similar argument without making any assumption
about costs using a revealed preference reasoning. That is, one can infer that the current
system of lawmaking is not the cheapest possible from the fact that this system has devel-
oped in a state whose influential bar is interested in maximizing profits from legal serv-
ices.
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Consequently, maintaining indeterminate standards may further
entrench Delaware as the corporate chartering leader."8
CONCLUSION
The rationale this Article offers for director and officer li-
ability insurance and indemnification relies on the value of corpo-
rate litigation as a public good.79 The benefit of corporate litiga-
tion in clarifying the law accrues to all finms at once. Because nei-
ther shareholders of individual firms nor attorneys suing on their
behalf can capture this benefit, neither has sufficient incentives
to sue unless compensated to an extent that might overdeter de-
fendants. Insurance and indemnification addresses this market
failure through reverse decoupling, which allows courts to com-
pensate plaintiffs for their litigation expenditures without im-
posing the full cost on defendants.
But to identify the manner in which director and officer in-
surance and indemnification responds to indeterminacy in corpo-
rate law is not to conclude that the existing system is efficient.
Shareholders of individual firms subsidize damage awards not
because it is efficient for the shareholder community as a whole,
but because of the need to recruit able directors and officers and
encourage risk-taking.' There is therefore no reason to expect
shareholders to enter into socially optimal insurance and indem-
nification contracts with corporate fiduciaries. In particular,
shareholders may well protect fiduciaries from more liability than
is necessary to achieve the goals of decoupling.8' Moreover, the
existence of a competitive insurance market does not guarantee
that insurance contracts are socially optimal. All it guarantees is
that insurance prices are actuarially fair for the coverage firms
select.
78 See Kamar, 98 Colum L Rev 1908 (cited in note 4).
See Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 85 (cited in note 3); Rock, 44 UCLA L Rev at 1020
(cited in note 30); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 34-35 (Harvard 1991). For discussion of precedent as a public good in gen-
eral, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 567 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
' See, for example, Louis Harris and Associates, Outside Directors and the Risks They
Face-III 43 (1998) (reporting survey results according to which 89 percent of the outside
directors of Fortune 1000 firms say that inadequate or no liability insurance would be a
major barrier to joining a board).
S Shareholders of individual firms do internalize the benefits from reducing the hi-
ability risk that directors and officers of those firms bear, and so insurance and indemnifi-
cation may be socially optimal for achieving this goal. But the benefits from developing the
law are shared by the entire shareholder community, and should not affect the decision of
shareholders of individual firms to provide fiduciaries with insurance and indemnification.
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While the absence of proper private incentives to set insurance
and indemnification coverage optimally may warrant regulation,
it is difficult to determine what regulation, if any, is best. The
discussion above demonstrates that computing the optimal regu-
lation directly involves such elusive variables as the level of de-
terrence, the incentives to sue in the absence of decoupling, and
the net social gain from case law. Theoretically, the results of the
competition among states in attracting incorporation could be the
key to the answer. These results are fairly clear. New York law
mandates the inclusion only of nominal personal coverage reten-
tion provisions in director and officer insurance policies. Dela-
ware law does not go even that far.82 And no state limits the ex-
tent of indemnification coverage when indemnification is permit-
ted. However, how to interpret these results is unclear. The bare
fact that Delaware maintains its preeminence in the market for
corporate chartering while allowing most fiduciary claims to set-
tle with full insurance and indemnification coverage is neutral
with respect to determining whether deterrence in that state is
optimal. It can be squared both with the view that Delaware law
is popular thanks to tailoring deterrence to fit shareholder needs
and with the view that Delaware law unduly shelters aberrant fi-
duciaries from liability. Nor does state competition guarantee
that Delaware law optimizes precedent production. Although
Delaware as a state can benefit from developing case law through
litigated cases, its bar can benefit from settlements as well. Fi-
nally, the very reliance on standards in Delaware law is not nec-
essarily optimal either. It may well reflect an advantage Dela-
ware gains from making its law dependent on its reputable adju-
dication services.
See NY Bus Corp Law § 726 (a)(3); 11 NY Comp Codes R & Regs tit 1, § 72; 8 Del
Code Ann § 145(g).
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